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SAVING THE SEASHORE: MANAGEMENT
PLANNING FOR THE COASTAL ZONE
The Walrus and the Carpenter
Were walking close at hand:
They wept like anything to see
Such quantities of sand.
"If this were only cleared away,"
They said, "it would be grand!"
It has been estimated that 53 percent of the population of the
United States (some 106 million people) lives within fifty miles of
the coasts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico,
and the Great Lakes. It is projected that 80 percent of the population,
or 225 million people, will occupy that same area by the' year 2000.1
The increasing and often competitive demands of industry, com-
merce, resource development, recreation, waste disposal, and other
such interests must be balanced against the harmful and often irreversi-
ble impact such activities have on the scemc beauty and fragile ecolog-
ical systems of the coastal zone.
Until very recently, the planning and management of the coastal
zone was almost entirely in the hands of local government.2 This frag-
mentation of responsibility, coupled with the local bias in favor of de-
velopment to increase revenue, has posed a serious threat to the
maintenance of the natural virtues of the coastal zone.3 For this
reason, it has become apparent that some form of federal and/or state
regulation of the coastal zone is necessary if it is-to serve as a resource
for the nation, yet still be preserved for the enjoyment of future genera-
tions.
In recognition of this need, Congress passed, on October 12,
1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.1 The following
month the voters of California went to the polls and passed the initia-
tive known as Proposition 20, now the California Coastal Zone Con-
servation Act of 1972.1 The federal act is designed only to provide
1. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1972).
2. Id. at 4-5.
3. Id.
4. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. 1973).
5. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoD § 11528.2 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. PUB. Rns.
CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1973).
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incentive to the states to enact legislation for coastal zone management,
and establishes guidelines for the kinds of state programs which will
qualify for federal assistance; the California act provides a detailed
blueprint for just such a program.
It is our intention to set forth the essential features of these acts,
and to consider the ways in which they do or do not establish realistic
mechanisms for the achievement of their stated goals. Although our
focus will be primarily on the California act, attention will be given
to shortcomings in the federal act as well, and suggestions will be made




Although several coastal zone conservation bills had been intro-
duced in California prior to 1972,6 the legislature had been unable
to pass a measure which would satisfy the divergent interests of conser-
vationists, land developers, public utilities, and other lobbies with a
a stake in the coastal zone. Finally, on November 15, 1972, the matter
was brought directly before the voters through an initiative known
as Proposition 20. This initiative was modeled after a bill, AB 730,
introduced in the 1970 session of the California legislature, ' and after
a similar bill, AB 1471, introduced in the 1971 session. 8 Proposition
6. See notes 7-8 infra.
7 CAL. LEGISLATURE, Assembly Final History, Reg. Sess., at 273 (1970); F
DooLrrLE, LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION ON THE CALIFORNIA COAST' THE
STATE ROLE 45-6 (U.C. Davis Institute of Governmental Affairs Environmental Qual-
ity Series No. 9, 1972) [hereinafter cited as DOOLITrLE]. AB 730 was sponsored by
Assemblymen Sieroty (D. Los Angeles), Dunlap (D. Vallejo), and Z'Berg (D. Sac-
ramento). Id. "AB 730, sponsored by three liberal Democrats, had little real chance
for success in a Republican controlled Legislature. In spite of the fact that these
three men were long-time champions of conservation causes, they received little real
support from organized groups or influential individuals. The fact that their bill was
never amended merely indicates that it was never under serious consideration in
committee or as a possible final measure on the subject. It was assigned to the
Assembly Natural Resources and Conservation Committee on February 18, 1970, and
moved from committee on August 21, 1970, without further action being taken." Id.
at 48. AB 2131, sponsored by Assemblyman Wilson (R. San Diego), did pass the
Assembly. Although AB 2131 was a relatively weak bill since it was restncted to
regulating rural land use, it died in the senate. CAL. LEGISLATURE, Assembly Final
History, Reg. Sess., at 658 (1970). Wilson later said that "corporate giants" had
actively opposed his bill. F DoOLiTrLE, supra at 47-50.
8. AB 1471 was sponsored by Assemblymen Sieroty (D. Los Angeles), Dunlap
(D. Vallejo), Z'Berg (D. Sacramento) and Moretti (D. North Hollywood). It passed
the assembly, but was defeated in the senate. CAL. LEGISLATURE, Assembly Final
History, Reg. Sess., pt. 2, at 527 (1971); DOOLrrrLE, supra note 7, at 59, 66-69.
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20 now constitutes Division 18 (commencing with section 27000) of
the Public Resources Code and is known officially as the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972.' The ultimate purpose of the
act is to generate a plan which will strike a balance between the inter-
ests which seek to exploit and develop the coastal zone and the need
to conserve its bounty and preserve its beauty.10
The act declares that the coastal zone of California is a distinct
and valuable resource, existing as a delicately balanced ecosystem, and
that it is necessary to preserve and protect the coastal zone for current
and succeeding generations.'1 The coastal zone is defined as seaward
to the end of the state's jurisdiction" and landward to the highest ele-
vation of the nearest coastal mountain range.' 8 An exception is made
in Los Angeles, Orange, and San Diego Counties, in which the land-
ward boundary is the shorter of the distance to the highest elevation
of the nearest coastal mountain range or five miles from the mean
high tide line.' 4
The California act intends to protect the coastal zone through
a state-wide master plan which is to be called the California Coastal
Zone Conservation Plan.'5 To develop this plan, the California act
creates the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commissioni6 and
six regional commissions.' 7 Since local governments have not ade-
quately protected the coastal zone in the past,' 8 the membership of
the regional commissions is split evenly between representatives of local
governments and members of the general public.' 9 This representa-
tion system prevents control of the regional commissions from falling
into the hands of the local governmental interests, yet allows the com-
missions to draw upon their expertise.2"
The function of the regional commissions is to prepare recommen-
Some of the reasons given for the defeat of AB 1471 were that it was too weak, had
too many exceptions, and was opposed by the Reagan administration. Id.
9. See note 5 supra.
10. CAL. PUB. Rns. CoDE § 27302 (West Supp. 1973).
11. Id. § 27001.
12. Id. § 27100; CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 170 (West 1966).
13. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27100 (West Supp. 1973).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 27001(b).
16. Id. § 27200.
17. id. § 27201.
18. See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.
19. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 27201 (West Supp. 1973). The act provides for
the appointment of all regional commission members except city representatives, sub-
squently provided for m CAL. Gov'T CODE 88 50270-81 (West Supp. 1973).
20. Hearings on AB 640, 730, and 2131 Before the Cal. Legislature Assembly
Natural Resources and Conservation Comm. on Coastal Zone Legislation 24 (May 13,
1970).
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dations to be submitted to the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Commission no later than April 1, 1975, concerning those coastal areas
to be reserved for specific uses, or within which specific uses are to
be prohibited.21 The regional commissions are empowered to accept
grants, contributions, and appropriations, 2 to contract for outside pro-
fessional assistance if necessary,23 to pursue judicial remedies utilizing
the legal representation of the State Attorney General,24 and to adopt,
after public hearings, any regulations deemed necessary to carry out
the provisions of the California act.25 In addition, the commissions
may request and utilize the advice and services of all federal, state,
and local agencies, and may request staff assistance from any federally
recognized regional planning agency 26
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission has final
responsibility for drawing together the recommendations of the re-
gional commissions and for submitting a comprehensive coastal zone
plan to the legislature no later than December 1, 1975 27 Membership
of the state commission is to be composed of six representatives of
the regional commissions and six members of the general public not
members of a regional commission. 28  To facilitate its purpose in pre-
paring the California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan, the state coin-
mission is endowed with the same powers and duties as the regional
commissions. 2
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan, as the name
suggests, is to be drawn primarily to conserve and protect the coast
of California. The act requires that the plan be consistent with four
stated objectives. ° First, the overall quality of the coastal zone envi-
ronment, including its amenities and aesthetic values, will be main-
tained, restored, and enhanced. 3' Second, all species of living organ-
ism will continue to exist.3 2 Third, there will be an orderly, balanced
utilization and preservation of coastal zone resources consistent with
sound conservation principles.33 Lastly, irreversible, irretrievable com-
mitments of coastal zone resources will be avoided.34
21. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27320(b) (West Supp. 1973).
22. Id. § 27240(a).
23. Id. § 27240(b).
24. Id. § 27240(c).
25. Id. § 27240(d).
26. Id. § 27241.
27 Id. § 27320(c).
28. Id. § 27200.
29. ld. §§ 27240-43. See text accompanying notes 22-26 supra.
30. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27302 (West Supp. 1973).
31. Id. § 27302(a).
32. ld. § 27302(b).
33. Id. § 27302(c).
34. Id. § 27302(d).
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The act specifically sets forth components which must be m-
cluded in the plan.a5 The public interest in the coastal zone is to
be defined,36 and ecological planning principles are to determine the
suitability and extent of allowable development.87 Provisions must be
made for the demands of land use,38 transportation,"9 conservation of
scenc and natural resources,40 public access, 41 recreation, 2 public
services and facilities (including power plants),48 ocean mineral and
living resource utilization,44 population distribution,45 and educational
and scientific uses.46  Furthermore, some land or water will be re-
served for specific uses, and certain uses will be prohibited entirely
in some areas.47 Finally, recommendations are to be made regarding
the nature and scope of permanent governmental control over the
coastal zone.48
Interim Controls
One of the critical problems facing any state establishing a com-
prehensive coastal zone conservation plan is that developments during
the years in which the plan is being formulated may destroy the very
resources which the plan seeks to protect, thus rendering the plan
largely obsolete before it is submitted. To avoid this result, it is neces-
sary to create some form of interin regulatory mechanism.
The California Act contains provisions which vest such interim
regulatory powers in the planning commissions. Any development
commenced on or after February 1, 1973, within a 'permit area' (and
on which substantial construction had not previously been performed)
must be approved by the regional commission.49  This permit area
35. Id. § 27304.
36. Id. § 27304(a).
37. Id. § 27304(b).
38. Id. § 27304(c)(1).
39. Id. § 27304(c)(2).
40. Id. § 27304(c)(3).
41. Id. § 27304(c)(4). See CAL. BuS. & Pnop. CODE § 11610.5 (West Supp.
1973) which prohibits a city or county from granting approval of a development
fronting the shore or coast unless reasonable public access is provided.
42. CAL. PuB. Ris. CoDE § 27304(c)(5) (West Supp. 1973).
43. Id. § 27304(c)(6).
44. Id. § 27304(c)(7).
45. Id. § 27304(c)(8).
46. Id. § 27304(c)(9).
47. Id. § 27304(d).
48. Id. § 27304(e).
49. Id. § 27400. See notes 58-60 & accompanying text infra for exceptions.
The relevant part of section 27400 reads, "On or after February 1, 1973, any person
wishing to perform any development within the permit area shall obtain a permit
authorizing such development . . " CAL. PuB. REs. CoDE § 27400 (West Supp.
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extends seaward to the limit of the state's jurisdiction (three miles),
but is not coextensive with the coastal zone landward, being confined
to a strip 1,000 yards wide above the mean high tide mark." The
area of jurisdiction of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and De-
velopment Commission is excluded, 5' as is any urban land which
was developed and stabilized to a residential density of four or more
dwellings per acre on or before January 1, 1972.52 Also, local gov-
1973). The California Supreme Court, by a 4-3 vote with Justice Clark writing for
the majority, construed "wishing to perform any development" as meaning "wishing
to commence any development." San Diego Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd.,
9 Cal. 3d 888, 513 P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973). This construction is based
partially on an analysis of the section contained in the ballot pamphlet furnished voters
which stated that permits would be required for "any proposed development." (court's
emphasis). Id. at 891, 513 P.2d at 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 378. The majority also
argued that the voters did not intend a moratorium, and that to require a permit for
developments commenced before February 1, 1973, would have resulted in a moratorium
because of procedural delays. Id. at 892, 513 P.2d at 130-31, 109 Cal. Rptr. 378-79.
Justice Mosk, writing for the dissent, argued that "wishing to perform any devel-
opment" should be construed as "wishing to complete or carry out any development,"
which conforms to the primary definition of "perform." The dissent argued further
that requiring permits for developments commenced before February 1, 1973, would
not have created a moratorium as a practical matter. Id.
Although there may be some basis for the majority's holding, their opinion fails
to give adequate attention to the public interest in the coastline. In the words of Jus-
tice Mosk, "It is disturbing, and perhaps significant, that the majority opinion gives
only fleeting recognition to the salutory purposes of the act, and totally ignores the
background serving as impetus for its enactment." Id. at 901, 513 P.2d at 138, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 386.
The majority is sympathetic to the interests of builders who performed substantial
construction prior to February 1, 1973, although this construction may cause substan-
tial harm to the coastline. These builders are now exempted from the act's require-
ments in part because it would be "unjust" to impose a permit requirement on builders
who "relied on the absence of an express requirement." On the other hand, it is
questionable whether the majority's decision was "just" to the California electorate
which declared that "the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural re-
source belonging to all the people land] that the permanent protection of the remain-
ing natural and scenic resources of the coastal zone is a paramount concern "
CAL. Pua. RES. CODE § 27001 (West Supp. 1973). The majority's opinion should
have accommodated the competing public and private interests involved m imposing a
permit requirement on builders performing substantial work before February 1, 1973.
A reasonable accommodation was suggested by the dissent-that the builder must
apply for a permit, but that the commission must issue it. The regional commission
should then be able to impose reasonable requirements which would allow the com-
pletion of the development without a "gross emasculation of the act." Id.
50. CAL. PUa. RES. CODE § 27104 (West Supp. 1973). If a body of water
not subject to tidal action lies within the permit area, that body of water plus a strip
1,000 yards wide surrounding it is included in the permit area. Id. § 27104(b).
51. Id. § 27104(a).
52. Id. § 27104(c). Urban land is stabilized if 80 percent of the lots are built
upon to the maximum density or intensity of use permitted by zoning regulations
existing as of January 1, 1972. Id. § 27104(c)(2).
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ernments may request that commercial or industrial areas zoned, de-
veloped, and stabilized for such use prior to January 1, 1972, be ex-
cluded. 3  Such exclusions, however, are subject to the condition that
no substantial change in density, height, or nature of use occurs, and
may be revoked by the regional commission after public hearing.5"
Permits will not be issued unless the regional commission is satis-
fied that the development will have no substantial adverse environmen-
tal impact, and that it is consistent with the findings and declarations
of the purposes of the act and with the objectives it sets forth.55 All
permits are subject to conditions58 designed to allow access to beaches
and recreation areas, to reserve recreation areas and wildlife preserves,
to provide for solid and liquid waste treatment, and to avoid danger
of floods, landslides, erosion, siltation, or structural failure in event
of an earthquake. 57  Exempted from such permit requirements are re-
pairs and improvements to existing single-family residences,5" construc-
tion projects which have acquired vested rights prior to November 8,
1972,51 and maintenance dredging of existing navigation channels pur-
53. Id. § 27104(c)(2).
54. Id. § 27104(c).
55. Id. § 27402. For the findings and declarations of the Act as set forth in
section 27001, see text accompanying note 11 supra. For the objectives of the act as
set forth in section 27302, see text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
56. Although the act uses the term "conditions," it appears that such conditions
are in fact requirements, since the language used in the act is "shall be subject to
reasonable terms and conditions." CAL. PuB. REs. CODB § 27403 (West Supp.
1973) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 27405(a). The repairs and improvements must not exceed $7,500.
Id.
59. Id. § 27404 (West Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 28, April 18, 1973), amending
CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 27404 (West Supp. 1973). The court's construction of sec-
tion 27400 in San Diego Regional Comm'n v. See the Sea, Ltd., 9 Cal. 3d 888, 513
P.2d 129, 109 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1973) (see note 49 supra) has the practical effect of
nullifying the exemption provision of section 27404. Under section 27404, a party
seeking an exemption based on vested rights is required to demonstrate that, prior to
November 8, 1972, ". . he has in good faith and in reliance upon the building permit
diligently commenced construction and performed substantial work on the development
and incurred substantial liabilities for work and materials necessary therefor . . "
CAL. PuB. Ras. CODE § 27404 (West Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 28, April 18, 1973), amending
CAL. Pun. Ras. CODE § 27404 (West Supp. 1973). But under the majority's con-
struction of section 27400 in See the Sea, a developer is not required to secure a per-
mit if he has performed substantial work prior to February 1, 1973. Thus, any person
who would have qualified for an exemption under section 27404 is not required to ob-
tarn a permit under section 27400. The majority argued that section 27404 exempts
some persons who are required to obtain permits under section 27400. These are
persons who acted in reliance on a building permit obtained prior to November 8, 1972,
and demolished structures or incurred substantial expenses and liabilities preparatory
to construction. Id. at 893, 513 P.2d at 132, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
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suant to a permit from the United States Army Corps of Engineers.6"
An affirmative vote of a majority of the total authorized mem-
bership of the regional commission, or of the state commission on ap-
peal, is required to authorize the issuance of a permit.6 ' For certain
specified activities, such as dredging, filling, reducing the size of
beaches, restricting access to beaches, impairing the view from coastal
highways, or adversely affecting water quality, commercial or sport
fisheries, or agricultural uses currently existing, permit applications
must be approved by a iwo-thirds vote of the total authorized member-
ship of the regional commission, or of the state commission on ap-
peal.62 The denial of a permit has the same effect as an injunction
against development,63 but it avoids some of the difficulties involved
in the pursuit of equitable remedies. Thus there is no requirement
of a showing of immediate and irreparable harm, no bond to be posted,
and no need for a "balancing of the equities" test. If there is any
showing of substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect, the
permit will be demed. 64
Any development within the permit area not authorized by a re-
regional commission constitutes a violation of the act,65 and renders
the violator subject to a civil fine not to exceed $10,000.66 In addi-
tion, a development performed in violation of the act carries a penalty
of $500 for each day in which the violation persists.6" Appeal of
a decision of a regional commission may be had to the state commis-
sion, which may reverse, affirm, or modify the decision or action of
The majority apparently has misinterpreted section 27404 which requires actual
commencement of construction and substantial work prior to November 8, 1972.
There is no indication that the section included, within its definition of vested rights,
preparatory steps to construction, such as demolition. The regional cominussion ar-
gued that the exemptions provided in section 27404 implied that all others who did
not qualify for these exemptions must obtain permits. Id. at 892, 513 P.2d at 131, 109
Cal. Rptr. at 379. The majority rejected this argument on the basis of its analysis of
section 27400 and because it would be "unjust," in the absence of an express require-
ment, to imply a permit requirement which would result in costly delay. Id. at 892-93,
513 P.2d at 131-32, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80. The dissent, however, contended that
a reasonably prudent businessman would have been aware of the permit requirement
and would have deferred construction for a few weeks and applied to the regional
commission for a permit after February 1, 1973. Id. at 901, 513 P.2d at 137, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 385.
60. Id. § 27405(b).
61. Id. § 27400.
62. Id. § 27401.
63. Id. § 27400; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 525, 1209(5) (West 1954, 1972).
64. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27402(a) (West Supp. 1973).
65. Id. § 27400. Any violation of the act is subject to exceptions mentioned in
notes 58-60 & accompanying text supra.
66. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27500 (West 1973).
67 Id. § 27501.
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the regional commission.6 8 The act also provides that "[a]ny person,
. . . including an applicant for a permit, aggrieved by the decision
or action of the commission or regional commission shall have a right
to judicial review ... ",9
Thus, while generating a plan for the regulation of the coastal
zone, the regional commissions must also regulate interim development.
The specific criteria on which a development is to be approved, there-
fore, may be expected to remain inchoate during the early formula-
tion of the plan. Suggestions as to how this paradox might be resolved
ranged from that of Councilman Roy Holm, City of Laguna Beach,
who urged a complete moratorium on development, 70 to that of Lieu-
tenant Governor Ed Reinecke, who felt that interim controls need not
be imposed at all.71
Drawing upon the experience of the San Francisco Bay Conser-
vation and Development Commission, the most sensible approach
would appear to be the granting of such permits as are not in conflict
with the spirit and objectives of the act, and the denial of permits
where there is any doubt in the matter. 71 Since limited coastal re-
sources may be irretrievably lost, or delicate ecological systems irrepar-
ably damaged, it is clearly in the public interest to err on the side
of caution.
In apparent accord with this position, the California act specifi-
cally places the burden of proof upon the applicant for a development
permit.73 This provision represents a departure from the common law
rule that the burden of proving harm rests upon one who objects to
the utilization of resources, but in the days of the formulation of this
common law rule there was neither the scarcity of resources nor the
sharply competitive demands placed upon them that exists today 74 Al-
location of the burden of proof often serves as an effective tool for
shaping social policies, and since it is imperative that the need for
environmental protection and conservation be adequately reflected in
68. Id. § 27423. The California act does not specify what standards are to be
applied by the state commission when it hears an appeal. Presumably, the state com-
mission would apply the same standards as the regional commission. See note 55 and
accompanying text supra.
69. CAL. PuB. Rns. CODE § 27424 (West Supp. 1973). For a discussion of this
provision, see text accompanying notes 90-105 infra.
70. Ilearngs on Public Interest in the Coastline Before the Cal. Legislature
Assembly Natural Resources and Conservation Comm. on Coastal Zone Legislation
233 (Dec. 18-19, 1969).
71. Id., at 14.
72. Id., at 203.
73. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 27402(b) (West Supp. 1973).
74. J. Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAw AND THE
ENVIMONMENT 106-08 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970).
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the law, the consumer of natural resources should bear the responsi-
bility for justifying his actions. 5
It should be noted that the commissions are empowered to call
upon their own expert staff, upon other related agencies, and upon
outside professionals for assistance.7 6 It is important to provide the
regional commissions with access to independent expert opinions so
that the commissions will not be forced to rely solely upon the infor-
mation supplied by the applicant.
Citizen Suits
One of the most frustrating obstacles in the path of effective citi-
zen participation in the struggle for environmental protection has been
judicial insistence on a showing of standing to sue. In the opinion
of Ramsey Clark:
[Standing] limitations are anachromsms that are very costly to
America today. There isn't any single cause that contributes more
to the frustrations of modern life than the powerlessness of people
to affect things of vital importance to them.
You can't sue; you have just got to live with it. If the garbage
isn't collected, if the park you sit m is being leveled by bulldozers,
you can't do anything. We can't go on like that. People must
have the power through legal process to affect things that are
important to them.
These old ideas of standing to sue which came from the 18th
and 19th centuries are inadequate to mass population. 77
Although the California State Attorney General can obtain equit-
able relief to prevent impairment, pollution, or destruction )f the envi-
ronment,7 8 there are no provisions in the California codes specifically
enabling a private citizen to maintain a suit, and such suits may be
barred by lack of standing or failure to state a cause of action. Obvi-
ously, however, it is simply not possible for the Office of the Attorney
General to investigate and prevent the manifold offenses against the
environment continually taking place throughout the State of Califor-
mia.
In recognition of this, the Califorma Coastal Zone Conservation
Act has provided a number of ways in which any person may enforce
the provisions of the act.79 These "citizen suits" may be divided into
75. Id. at 108-19.
76. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27240(b), 27241-42 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. ADM.
CODE tit. 14, § 1318(a).
77. Hearings on S. 3575 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Natural Resources,
and the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
80, at 26 (1970) (testimony of Ramsey Clark).
78. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12607 (West Supp. 1973).
79. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE §§ 27425-27 (West Supp. 1973). In addition to
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three categories: suits against violators of the act, appeals to the state
commission concerning the approval of a permit by a regional commis-
sion, and petitions for writs of mandate.
Suits Against Violators of the California Act
Standing is given to any person to maintain an action for declara-
tory and equitable relief to restrain violations of the California act,"°
and also to bring suit for the recovery of the civil penalties provided
for in the act.8 ' To mtigate the financial burden upon the person
bringing such an action, the costs of the litigation, including reasonable
attorney's fees, are to be awarded to a successful plaintiff.8 2
"Costs", as used in the California act, should be interpreted to
include reasonable expert witness fees,88 since they are as much a cost
of litigation as attorney's fees. Under current California case law, the
fees of an expert employed by one of the parties are not normally
allowed as costs. 84  However, fees of court appointed experts,88 and
of those employed by the parties,86 may be awarded at the discretion
of the courts. Unfortunately, such precedents are not very helpful
since they essentially involve litigation between private parties, es-
pousing private interests.
Since expert testimony is often required in environmental suits,
it would be advisable to have a provision in the California act clearly
allowing reasonable expert witness' fees. Since the individual plaintiff
who sues to enforce the provisions of the act does so on behalf of
the people of California, for whose benefit and in whose name the
act was passed, such actions should not be discouraged by the high
cost of obtaining the necessary expert testimony. 7  Precedent for such
these citizen suits, the act provides that the state attorney general shall provide legal
representation for the regional and state commissions. Id. § 27240(c) (West Supp.
1973).
80. Id. § 27425.
81. Id. § 27426. For a discussion of civil penalties, see text accompanying
notes 65-67 supra.
82. CAL. PuB. Ris. CODE § 27428 (West Supp. 1973).
83. Cf. Kennedy v. Byrum, 201 Cal. App. 2d 474, 483, 20 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103
(1962) (fees of court-appointed expert witness included as costs under section 731 of
California Evidence Code which provides for recovery of such fees as costs) (semble).
84. Rabinowitch v. California W. Gas. Co., 257 Cal. App. 2d 150, 161-62,
65 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8 (1967).
85. Kennedy v. Byrum, 201 Cal. App. 2d 474, 483, 20 Cal. Rptr. 98, 103 (1962)
(semble).
86. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 215 Cal. App. 2d 140, 147-48, 30 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53
(1963).
87. Karagams, Public Suits: The Search for Evidence, m ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
54-60 (C. HAssEnr ed. 1971).
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a provision, although discretionary, does exist in the Clean Air
Amendments of 197088 and the Water Pollution Control Act of 1972.9
Appeals to the State Commission
In addition to citizen suits for redressing violations of the Cali-
forma act, the act also provides that any applicant or any person ag-
grieved by the approval of a permit by a regional commission may
appeal to the state comrmssion. 90 The right to appeal the granting
of a permit is therefore not limited to the applicant for a permit, but
extends to any person "aggrieved" by such a decision.
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what was intended by the use
of the word "aggrieved." Since "aggrieved" does not appear in those
sections granting power to any person to seek declaratory and equitable
relief and civil penalties for violations of the act,9 ' it may be argued
that its inclusion in the sections dealing with permit appeals implies
the imposition of a requirement of standing, based on some showing
of actual or threatened harm to the individual seeking to prevent the
issuance of a permit.9 However, such a position is inconsistent with
the overall intent of the California act, which specifically declares the
coastal zone to be a resource of "all the people," and that it must
be preserved and protected "for the enjoyment of the current and suc-
ceeding generations. ' 93 It is clear that the improper granting of devel-
opment permits by the regional commission is an injury to all the peo-
ple, and that everyone who wishes the coastal zone to be preserved
and protected for himself and for his descendants is aggrieved by such
a decision. Thus, the objectives of the act may be furthered most
effectively by viewing the use of the word "aggrieved" as unfortunate
drafting, rather than as a limitation on standing.
Such an interpretation of aggrieved is consistent with the rule ap-
plied in Estate of Colton,94 wherein the California Supreme Court held
that a party was aggrieved and thus entitled to appeal if he had "an
interest recogmzed by law in the subject matter of the judgment, which
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (Supp. 1973).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (Supp. 1973).
90. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27423 (West Supp. 1973).
91. Id. §§ 27425-26-
92. Clearly, section 27423 does not authorize an aggrieved third party to appeal
the decision of a regional commission denying a permit. Id. § 27423.
93. Id. § 27001.
94. 164 Cal. 1, 127 P 643 (1912); accord, Buffington v. Ohmert, 253 Cal. App.
2d 254, 255, 61 Cal. Rptr 360, 361 (1967). But cf. County of Alameda v. Carleson,
5 Cal. 3d 730, 736-37, 488 P.2d 953, 957, 97 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1971) (stricter
standard applied requiring that party's interest be immediate, pecuniary, and substan-
tial, and not nominal or remote consequence of judgment). If the showing of a
pecuniary injury were required, there might be no person who had standing since a
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interest is injuriously affected by the judgment."95  Under the Califor-
nia act, the subject matter of a permit appeal is the coastal zone of
California, which has been declared to be "a distinct and valuable na-
tural resource belonging to all the people . . . ."6 This declaration
creates an interest recognized by law in individual plaintiffs who are
thus aggrieved by the issuance of a permit.9 7
Precedent for such an interpretation may be found in other areas
of public interest litigation, wherein the courts have demonstrated a
willingness to interpret statutory terms liberally in order to further leg-
islative policy. In Barquis v. Merchants Collection Ass'n,98 for exam-
ple, the court broadly interpreted the term "unfair business practice"
to include the practice of a collection agency which filed complaints
in distant counties to gain an unconscionable advantage over its al-
leged debtors. This interpretation was prompted by a finding of legis-
lative concern for adequate protection of the consumer class. 99 In the
field of environmental law the California Supreme Court, in Friends
of Mammoth v Board of Supervisors'"° broadly interpreted the word
"project," as used in the California Environmental Quality Act of
1970,101 to include the issuance of a conditional use or building per-
mit.102 The court's decision was based in part on "what appears to
be a clear legislative mandate that the [Environmental Quality Act]
be given a broad construction and that it apply to private actions for
which a permit is necessary. ... "I"
Furthermore, the California act was passed not by the California
legislature, but directly by the electorate in the form of Proposition
coastal development might increase tax revenues and property values. The Carleson
test should be rejected as inapplicable to environmental suits. where economic loss is
essentially irrelevant.
95. Estate of Colton, 164 Cal. 1, 5, 127 P 643, 645 (1912).
96. CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE § 27001 (West Supp. 1973).
97. In the event that a court is reluctant to grant standing to the general public
to appeal the issuance of a permit, an analogy to a writ of mandate may prove per-
suasive. The individual seeking the appeal is enforcing a public right m the coastal
zone which has been thwarted by public officials. Since the appeal functions as a
writ of mandate, it is logical and reasonable to apply the standing requirements of
the writ. See text accompanying notes 106-16 infra.
98. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 496 P.2d 817, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972).
99. Id. at 107-10, 496 P.2d at 826-28, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 754-56; cf. Diaz v. Kay-
Dix Ranch, 9 Cal. App. 3d 588, 591-93, 88 Cal. Rptr. 443, 444-46 (1970) (court
indicated that practice of knowingly employing Mexican nationals, present in United
States in violation of federal immigration laws, could constitute unfair business prac-
tice).
100. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
101. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-174 (West Supp. 1973).
102. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 257, 502
P.2d 1049, 1055, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 (1972).
103. Id.
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20. Precedent for a liberal interpretation of the language of this type
of legislation may be found in the cases of Kaiser v Hopkins'" and
Burger v Employees' Retirement System," 5 which state that courts
will interpret measures adopted by popular vote according to the popu-
lar or general sense of the words, unless the very subject or text
suggests a technical sense.
It is important that such a liberal interpretation of the word "ag-
grieved" as used in the act be made, since it is crucial to allow the
general public, by the mechanism of citizen suits, to monitor the deci-
sions of the various commissions, and to insist that their actions display
the kind of farsighted good judgment which is needed for the protec-
tion of the coastal zone.
Writs of Mandate
The California act also provides for a third type of citizen suit-
a petition for a writ of mandate against either the state commission
or a regional commission." °6 The writ of mandate differs from the
provision for permit appeals in that it is an action in a state court
against a commission, 07 is not restricted to challenging the issuance
of permits, 0 8 and is grounded in a body of case law'0 9 defining who
is an appropriate petitioner.
Along with the issuance of permits, the regional commissions are
charged with the performance of other important duties. They are,
for example, required to prepare conclusions and recommendations re-
garding those areas to be reserved for specific uses, or within which
certain uses are to be prohibited."10 They must also file annual prog-
ress reports with the governor and the legislature."' The general
public therefore should and does have the authority to bring citizen
suits, in the form of petitions for writs of mandate, to ensure the proper
performance of all the duties of the commissions.
There are also procedural differences between an appeal to the
104. 6 Cal. 2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278 (1936).
105. 101 Cal. App. 2d 700, 226 P.2d 38 (1951).
106. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27424 (West Supp. 1973).
107 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1084-97 (West 1955), as amended (West Supp.
1973).
108. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27424 (West Supp. 1973). Since section 27424 is
placed with provisions concerned with permits, it could be argued that section 27424 is
restricted to reviewing the issuance of permits. However, sections 1084-97 of the
Code of Civil Procedure would then be the basis for reviewing commission decisions
which do not concern the issuance of permits. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 1084-97
(West 1955), as amended (West Supp. 1973).
109. See note 114 infra.
110. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27320(b) (West Supp. 1973).
111. Id. § 27600(a).
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state commission and a petition for writ of mandate. An appeal must
be filed within ten days of the decision of the regional commission,
and must comply with the form established by the state commission.112
Petitions for writs of mandate, however, are state court proceedings,
and must therefore comply with the statutory requirements of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure, which requires, for example, a ven-
fied petition of the party beneficially interested and adequate notice
to all parties before the writ will issue.1
13
Perhaps the most significant difference between a petition for a
writ of mandate and an appeal to the state commission is the body
of case law defining the standing requirements for a writ of mandate.
The courts have been liberal in granting standing to an individual citi-
zen to enforce a public duty concerning some public right, in that
a plaintiff need not show that he has a legal or special interest in
the subject matter; it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in
having the laws executed and the public duty in question enforced.' 14
Although the California act states that a writ of mandate may
be sought by an applicant for a permit or by any person aggrieved
by a decision or action of a commission,"15 this should not be inter-
preted as adding to the standing requirements for a writ. Once again,
since the protection of the coastal zone will be furthered by an active
public monitoring the actions of its servants, the same policy considera-
tion which favors the granting of standing to all citizens to appeal
the issuance of permits is equally applicable here." 6
The Federal Act
General Provisions
The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972,117 unlike
the California act, does not purport to erect any agency for the achieve-
ment of its goals, but is designed instead to provide an incentive for
the states to establish their own coastal zone management programs.
112. Id. §§ 27240(d), 27420(c); CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 14, § 13700.
113. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1084-97 (West 1955), as amended (West Supp.
1973).
114. Diaz v. Quitonano, 268 Cal. App. 2d 807, 811-12, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362
(1969), quoting Board of Social Welfare v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 2d 98,
100-01, 162 P.2d 627, 628-29 (1945).
115. CAL. PuB. Rus. CODE § 27424 (West Supp. 1973).
116. Citizen suits will help ensure the integrity and wisdom of the commissions'
decisions, but there are other provisions which act as safeguards. There are rules
forbidding conflicts of interest for members of the commissions. Id. §§ 27230-34.
Public representatives sit on the commissions, Id. §§ 27200-01, and all meetings are
open to the public. Id. § 27224.
117. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. 1973).
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Congress states in its Declaration of Policy that it is in the national
interest to encourage the states to establish management programs
which will wisely allocate the land and water resources of the coastal
zone. Full consideration must be given to the ecological, cultural, his-
toric, and aesthetic values, as well as to needs for economic develop-
ment.'18 In addition, the federal act seeks to preserve, protect, de-
velop, and restore resources of the coastal zone for this and succeeding
generations, 119 and to encourage the cooperation and coordination of
all federal, regional, state, and local agencies involved n coastal zone
management. 120
The definition of the coastal zone used in the federal act is less
specific than the California definition, 12 comprising coastal waters and
adjacent shorelands "strongly influenced by each other," extending sea-
ward to the limit of the United States territorial waters but landward
only to the extent necessary to control shorelands. 12 - Any state and
certain specific territories bordering on the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans,
the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or the Great Lakes is eligible
to receive annual federal grants to assist in the development of coastal
zone management programs. 23 These grants, authorized by the Secre-
tary of Commerce, may not exceed two-thirds of the cost of the pro-
gram development, and are limited to a period of three years. 2 4  No
grant to any one state may be more than ten percent nor less than
one percent of the total amount, 125 nine million dollars annually, which
has been appropriated under this act.
126
There are six specific items which must be included in the man-
agement programs of states seeking grants.127  The program must de-
scribe the state's organizational structure, 28 its control mechanisms, 29
and guidelines on priorities. 30 In addition, there must be a descrip-
tion of the boundaries of the state's coastal zone,131 a list of permis-
118. Id. § 1452(b).
119. Id. § 1452(a).
120. Id. H8 1452(c)-(d).
121. See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
122. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (Supp. 1973).
123. Id. §§ 1453(c), 1454. The specified territories are Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, Guam and American Samoa. Id. § 1453(c).
124. Id. § 1454(c).
125. Id. § 1454(e).
126. Id. § 1464(a)(1).. It is likely that sections 27302 and 27304 of the Cal-
ifornia Act are sufficiently broad to permit California to qualify for grants under the
federal act. See text accompanying notes 30-48 supra.
127 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454(a)-(b) (Supp. 1973).
128. Id. § 1454(b) (6).
129. Id. § 1454(b)(4).
130. Id. § 1454(b)(5).
131. Id. § 1454(b)(1).
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sible land and water uses,' 32 and an inventory of areas of particular
concern.' 3  Subsequent grants may not be made to a state unless
the Secretary of Commerce is convinced that the initial grant has been
properly utilized in the development of a satisfactory program.1 34
Once the coastal zone management plans have been developed,
the secretary may authorize additional grants on the same basis (one
to ten percent of total appropriation, but not more than two-thirds
the total cost) for the purposes of administering the program. 1- Be-
fore such grants may be made, the secretary must make a number
of findings.'1 6  First, he must determine that the state has the orga-
nization'1 7 and authority1 38 to implement such a program, including
the power to administer land and water use regulations, control de-
velopment, resolve conflicts among competing interests,139 and acquire
fee simple and lesser interests in land.140 The state must also have
some method of controlling land and water uses, either directly or by
review.141  Second, the state must provide for public hearings, 42 an
opportunity for the full participation of all relevant governmental agen-
cies and of all interested parties, public and private, 4 3 and a mecha-
nism for communication among all such interested parties.' Third,
the plan must be developed in accordance with the rules and regula-
tions promulgated by the secretary, 45 must be coordinated with exist-
mg management plans, 4 6 and, in addition, must reflect national 47 and
132. Id. § 1454(b)(2).
133. Id. § 1454(b)(3).
134. Id. § 1454(c). For guidance purposes, Congress suggests that the follow-
mg be included in a management program: (1) tides and currents, including their
effects on beaches and shorelines; (2) floods and flood damage protection; (3) ero-
sion, land stability, climatology, and meteorology; (4) ecology, including estuarme
habitats; (5) recreation; (6) open space, physical and visual access; (7) navigation
and commercial fishing; (8) present ownership and present uses; (9) present laws and
regulations at all levels; (10) present population and future trends, including antici-
pated impact; and (11) other relevant factors. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2nd
Sess. 11 (1972).
135. 16 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. 1973).
136. Id. § 1455(c).
137. Id. § 1455(c)(6).
138. Id. § 1455(c)(7).
139. Id. § 1455(d)(1).
140. Id. § 1455(d)(2).
141. Id. § 1455(e)(1).
142. Id. § 1455(c)(3).
143. Id. § 1455(c)(1).
144. Id. § 1455(c) (2) (A).
145. Id. § 1455(c)(2)(B).
146. Id. § 1455(c)(1).
147. Id. § 1455(c)(8).
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regional1 48 interests and establish procedures for designating areas as
recreational, ecological, or aesthetic reserves. 149  Finally, the governor
must have approved the plan' 50 and appointed a single agency to re-
ceive and administer grants. 15' Assuming that all of these criteria
are met, the state, with the approval of the secretary, is free to allocate
the federal funds which it receives to local or regional agencies, and
to develop a program in segments, if it so desires, so that attention
may be given where it is most urgently needed.152
The Secretary of Commerce must coordinate his functions with
all other interested federal agencies, 3 and continually review the man-
agement programs and the performance of each state.' The federal
act also has provision for keeping records of plans, projected costs, and
fund allocation,"55 for the establishment of an advisory committee to
assist the secretary in deciding policy issues,156 for the creation of estu-
arne sanctuaries, 15 7 for the preparation of an annual report,15 and
for the promulgation of necessary rules and regulations.'59
Voluntary Compliance
One of the most obvious shortcomings of the federal act is its
reliance on voluntary compliance by the states. Despite findings by
Congress that the management and preservation of the coastal zone
is a matter of utmost concern, participation in coastal zone manage-
ment programs is not required of the coastal states. Instead, it is
stated:
The committee hopes that the States will move forthrightly to find
a workable method for state, local, regional, federal and public
involvement in the regulation of non-federal land and water use
within the coastal zone.' 60
148. Id. § 1455(e)(2).
149. Id. § 1455 (c) (9).
150. Id. 5 1455 (c) (4).
151. Id. § 1455(c) (5).
152. Id. 55 1455(f), 1455(h).
153. Id. § 1456(a).
154. Id. § 1458(a).
155. Id. § 1459.
156. Id. § 1460.
157 Id. § 1461. "Estuarine sanctuary means a research area which may include
any part or all of an estuary, adjoining transitional areas, and adjacent uplands, con-
stituting to the extent feasible a natural unit, set aside to provide scientists and students
the opportunity to examine over a period of time the ecological relationships within
the area." ld. § 1453(e).
158. Id. § 1462.
159. Id. § 1463.
160. S. REP No. 753, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess. 5-6 (1972).
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So tenuous a hope is inconsistent with the findings of the committee,
expressed in the very next sentences:
In light of the competing demands and the urgent need to protect
our coastal zone, the existing institutional framework is too diffuse
in focus, neglected in importance, and inadequate in the regulatory
authority needed to do the job. The key to more effective use of the
coastal zone in the future is introduction of management systems
permitting conscious and informed choices among the various al-
ternatives. The an of this legislation is to assist in this very
critical goal.' 6 '
Although the aim of the legislation may be admirable, it will not
be able to reach its goal unless it is given sufficient impulse to over-
come the inertia of the states. Merely making funds available to those
states which choose to establish acceptable programs is not sufficient.
Indeed, it has been suggested that the failure to establish such pro-
grams in the past has been due to a lack of policy commitment, rather
than a shortage of funds, since any state could raise the sums of money
involved in such legislation without great difficulty. 162  In order to
ensure that the goal of this legislation is met, compliance by the coastal
states should be made mandatory. In the event that a state refuses,
participation should be coerced by penalties (for example, restriction
of federal funds for related programs such as the Highway Trust Fund,
the Land and Water Conservation Fund, or the Airport and Airway
Development Fund)168 or, if necessary, by establishing direct federal
management of the coastal zone of any state which fails to act on
its own within a reasonable time.' 64 Precedent for this type of action
is found in other legislation dealing with air and water pollution, and
such penalties have been found both desirable and necessary. 68
Interim Controls
The federal act contains no provision for interim controls during
the planning of coastal zone management programs. It appears that
this position was consciously taken; as expressed by Senator Hollings,
"I don't think we want to legislate affirmatively what they may or may
161. Id.
162. Hearings on H.R. 2492, 2493, and 9229 Before the Subcomm. on Ocean-
ography of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 16, at 257 (1971) (testimony of Dr. Georg Treichel).
163. Id., at 292 (letter from Larry E. Naake to the Committee Chairman, June 21,
1971).
164. Id., at 257 (testimony of Dr. Georg Treichel).
165. Hearings on S. 2802, 2393, 3118, 3183, and 3460 Before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography and the Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, 91st Cong.,
1st & 2nd Sess., ser. 59, pt. 2, at 1041 (1969-1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5 to-7 (Supp.
1973); 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. 1973).
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not do while they are planmng."' 6 6 The reason for this decision, how-
ever, is not at all clear. Indeed, this failure to provide for interim
permits to control development of the coastal zone during planmng
stages is another serious inadequacy in the federal act.16 Provision
for interim permits is not even one of the guidelines set down for the
creation of state coastal zone management plans. Fortunately, some
coastal states have recogmzed the necessity for interim controls and
have adopted statutes which reflect this concern. 168  However, many
of these statutes are severely limited. 69 The federal act should be
amended, consistent with its declared goal of assuring the preservation
of the coastal zone now and in the future, to require the states to
establish strong interim controls as a prerequisite to the granting of
federal funds.
Citizen Suits
The federal act is also deficient in failing to make any provision
for citizen suits as an element of the state coastal zone management
plans, despite testimony favorable to such a position, and despite ample
precedent in other federal acts.' 70 Although Congress has passed leg-
islation which would allow judicial review of the actions of the Secre-
tary of Commerce in admimstenng the federal act, 171 this legislation
would apply only to federal agencies, and not to the states. Provision
for citizen suits is thus needed as a part of each individual state manage-
ment plan.
Under current law, a party has standing to sue in the federal
courts on environmental issues only when he has suffered or will suf-
fer some substantial harm, economic or otherwise.17 2  Again, however,
166. Hearings on S. 582, 632, and 992 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and
Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, at
193 (1971).
167 For a discussion of interim controls in the California Act, see text accom-
panying notes 49-76 supra.
168. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000-650 (West Supp. 1973); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 704 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.123-.124 (1972); IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 27-623, 27-627 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 483-A.1 (1968); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN, § 43.51.685 (1970).
169. For example, the Florida and Washington statutes, apply only to state lands.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 253.123-.124 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.51.685 (1970).
170. Hearings on S. 2802, 2393, 3118, 3183, and 3460 Before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography and the Atmosphere of the Senate Comm. of Commerce, 91st Cong.,
Ist & 2nd Sess., ser. 59, pt. 2, at 1022, 1042; 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. 1973); 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (Supp. 1973); Id. § 4911. See Comment, Standing on the Side of
the Environment: A Statutory Prescription for Citizen Participation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q.
561 (1971).
171. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. H§ 701-06 (1970).
172. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see Comment, Mineral King:
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
such a test is inadequate to meet the demands of a growing society
in safeguarding the coastal zone by citizen action. Although some
states have authorized citizen suits to protect coastal areas, a strong,
mandatory provision to that effect should be made an integral part
of the federal act.
Conclusion
The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act is designed to
generate a plan for the wise and harmonious management of the
unique and highly valuable resources of California's coastline. Planning
commissions, at both state and regional levels, are charged with the
responsibility of presenting such a plan to the California legislature.
These commissions are also empowered to control development during
the formulation of the plan. Thus, California seemingly has complied
with the requirements of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act,
and should be eligible to receive a share of the financial stimulus pro-
vided by the federal act.
While it is encouraging to see that the federal and state govern-
ments are responding to public demands for coastline preservation,
much work remains to be done in order to ensure that this laudable
goal will in fact be achieved. Effective laws to protect America's
coastline must restrain short-range development with effective interim
controls, must encourage public participation and enforcement by al-
lowing the maintenance of citizen suits, and, in the case of federal
legislation, must mandate state compliance in establishing coastal zone
management programs. Bureaucratic inertia and the cupidity of pri-
vate developmental interests (walking close at hand) must not be al-
lowed to destroy in this generation the irreplaceable resources which
must be preserved for generations to come.
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